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Using two distinct health policy issues my research examines the relevance and 
ramifications of using cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to demonstrate real-world impacts of 
the policies. My dissertation discusses how these two situations represent particular 
challenges to cost-benefit analysis.  The challenges have specific implications for how 
scholars, agencies, and government entities should use CBA to evaluate policies. 
Specifically, my research finds that by separating CBA into four different approaches, a 
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THE FOUR TYPES OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
My research explores the potential policy repercussions of using cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) to evaluate two social issues: the Expanded Food and Nutrition Program 
and child immunization.  The primary objective of my research is to define several 
different approaches to CBA.  Hopefully these different approaches will provide policy 
analysts “new and improved” insights into CBA, and these insights will result in better 
policy evaluations and decisions. 
Policy evaluation is a process that involves identifying the purposes of a program, 
gathering information on the program’s costs and outputs, and evaluating the program 
through various statistical techniques. Historically, policy evaluation has been based on 
anecdotal evidence and thus, results have varied based on the bias of the evidence 
(Anderson, 2006).  In the last few years, however, systematic evaluation, which uses 
social science methodology to measure the effectiveness of a program, has been 
increasingly popular.  Many different types of systematic evaluation have been done 
(Rajgopal, 2002).  The experimental design method, where program data are collected 
before and program implementation, is a highly valid method. However, this method may 
not be feasible because of the expense and time investment required. Thus, the quasi-
experiment method, where the treatment group is compared to a “control” group with 
similar characteristics, is often used.   
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Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman (2004) suggest four kinds of assessment that may be 
appropriate at different stages of policy evaluation: the five-tiered approach, needs 
assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and impact evaluation. My research utilizes CBA as 
one of the four kinds of assessment suggested by Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman.   
 
The Role of Federalism in Policy 
 
It often makes more senses to examine policy at the state level before 
implementing and evaluating policy at the federal level.  The implementation of policy at 
the state level and the evaluation of the given policy can provide a plethora of 
information to policymakers.  States may be 1) an indicator for social problems or issues, 
or 2) a laboratory for implementation of a policy in order to determine whether it will 
work at the national level.  Implementation at the state level can act as a laboratory where 
policy evaluation components are built into new policies to increase the ease of 
evaluation.   
State level data may provide a better indicator of the magnitude of a problem in 
various socio-demographic levels than federal level data, which may provide a weaker 
signal.   Inman and Rubinfeld describe economic federalism as “the most decentralized 
structure of government capable of internalizing all economic externalities,” which grants 
justifications to decentralization to the lowest levels of government. Economic federalism 
further highlights the critical importance of economic efficiency. Inman and Rubinfield 
argue that relatively small communities may be able to provide many public services 
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more efficiently and determine the needs and wants of the public better than any other 
level of government. Oates (1994, p130) puts it even more clearly by arguing that 
“tailoring outputs to local circumstances will, in general, produce higher levels of well-
being than a centralized decision to provide some uniform level of output across all 
jurisdictions.”   
With regards to policy implementation and evaluation, science-based research and 
evaluation does not imply that there should be a national program that is the same from 
state to state.  State level research can help 1) identify states that are successful, and 2) 
pair those states with other states that are similar in culture and participant demographics.  
These pairings could refine provider and administrator education and performance, 
leading to improved health outcomes. 
Pressman and Wildavsky have noted that federalism can complicate 
implementation.  For many national policies, successful implementation requires 
coordination and cooperation between national, state, and local agencies.  There have 
been a number of policy diffusion models that have examined the role of states as a 
laboratory for policy innovation.  
 
Ethical ramifications of policy analysis  
 
 As my or any other research draws conclusions about what the “correct” policy 
decisions should be, it is important to emphasize that researchers have an ethical 
obligation to the policy community and to consumers. Errors are always a reality, but 
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scholars should take every precaution to avoid pitfalls and maintain ethical integrity. One 
of the major potential benefits of this research is that the policies examined here could be 
used to help lift individuals out of the poverty cycle.  The ethical obligation of 
researchers is to err on the side of not making a type I error.  A type I error would say that 
a policy is ineffective when it has actually been very effective in improving the lives of 
the nation’s citizens.  It is perhaps better to err on the side of a type II error: stating that 
the policy is effective when it is not.  
 
Compensation from the Perspective of Three Ethical Schools 
 
The biggest ethical issue associated with free markets in providing basic needs to 
all citizens is equity.  Democratic self-government, as in the United States, is designed to 
try to be fair with hopes to also be efficient.  When a project or program is implemented, 
some individuals will be made worse off and some better off.  When should 
compensation be given to those made worse off by the implementation of social policy?  
The three ethical schools all provide unique reasoning and answers.    
 
Duty (Rule) Based Ethics: 
Kantian ethics teaches us that we have a duty to do no harm, to only follow those 
actions that we would be willing to have universalized as general principles.  These 
actions should be used to treat other people as ends in themselves, not as means to an 
end.  Thus, in public life, the rule of law (such as tort law, eminent domain law, social 
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security law, workman’s compensation law, and many other types) should be followed to 
ensure that people are duly compensated for any harm they incur when a change occurs 
(Sterba, 1998).  Social contracts theorists would argue that compensation should be paid 
to those whose welfare has been reduced under the rule of law. Rawlsian ethics asks us to 
“hide behind the veil of ignorance” in making significant policy choices, ensuring that 
society’s rules provide equality of opportunity and freedom. John Rawls argued that 
“justice is the first virtue of social institutions” and thus it is more important than 
generosity or compassion.   Much earlier than Rawls, Plato wrote on the importance of 
justice not just for individuals but also for government. John Rawls argues for strict 
egalitarianism and equality of outcomes. He argues that we do not deserve rewards for 
our behavior just because we were naturally given attributes that others may not have 
(Rachels, 2003).  Compensation should be paid to those whose welfare is reduced by the 
program simply because that provides or restores equality of outcomes. 
This duty-based ethics follows the rule of the difference principle.  This principle 
states that social and economic inequalities, such as those caused by program changes, 
should be arranged so that they yield the greatest benefit to the least advantaged person.  
Kantian ethics also calls for intergenerational equity.  We have an obligation to make 
sure that the next generation is not made worse off by our actions.  Duty-based ethicists 
argue that all generations should have the same rights to resources because of the 






 Traditional virtue-based ethicists such as Aristotle claim that our goal should 
always be to do the “right thing.” In other words, our motives for performing behaviors 
matter.   Virtue-based justice says that individuals who have been wronged should be 
compensated.  To these ethicists, the virtue of justice means trying to correct some 
previous wrong.  Edmund Burke believed that government officials must be motivated 
outside of their office and must exhibit courage (Sterba, 1998).   
The problem with virtue-based ethics is that virtues often conflict.  If the measure 
is loyalty and the policymaker’s constituents are harmed (through paying higher taxes) 
when compensation is made to others, then the policymaker would be lauded for fighting 
compensation in the interest of his or her constituents.  But if, instead, the measure is 
justice, praise would go to the policymaker who supported due compensation. 
 
Outcomes-Based (Utilitarian) Ethics: 
Utilitarian ideals are calculating, impersonal, and purely consequentialist.  There 
is no place in utilitarianism for “people’s idiosyncratic preferences, histories, 
attachments, loyalties, or personal commitments” (Goodin, p. 8, 1995). A classical 
utilitarian would argue that if an action results in the greatest good for the greatest 
number, then it is the right action to follow.  Utilitarians would claim that, “right actions 
are the ones that produce the most good” (Rachels, 2007).   
John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham believed that the goodness of outcomes is 
determined by the degree to which they secure the greatest benefit to all concerned.  If 
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compensation to individuals made worse off by implementation of a project is going to 
raise taxes for the majority of people, utilitarians would argue that the project should not 
be undertaken based on the compensation principle. If the greatest benefit to all people is 
to be able to rely on the government to make stable and predictable choices, but the 
government makes unpredictable decisions that hurt people, then those who were made 
worse off deserve compensation.   
Goodin follows a utilitarian, outcomes-based approach to compensation and 
redistribution.  He argues that the practice of compensation is independent of any 
judgment about the justice of the previous distribution pattern.  He states that, “If we 
think it is morally desirable to ensure that people are able to plan and organize their lives 
in a sensible fashion, we must be systematic about both compensation and redistribution” 
(Goodin, p. 227, 1995).  Essentially, Goodin argues that people take into account the 
current set of laws and systems when they make plans.  He believes that people’s ability 
to plan their lives is morally desirable.  In certain situations, people should be able to 
count on compensation if they are harmed. Compensation should be swift and certain so 
that recipients can carry on their plans with minimum disruption from changes in policies 
and programs.  If the changes that occurred to reduce welfare were predictable and 







Distributive Justice in Static and Dynamic Situations 
 
Distributive justice with dynamic efficiency requires equality of outcomes.  
Isbister (2001) asks: To what does moral equality entitle us?  With regards to static 
efficiency, he argues that we should provide equality in opportunities, but he realizes that 
over time this equality in opportunities will lead to unequal outcomes, which will then 
again lead to unequal opportunities. He says, “Even if a state of perfect social justice 
could be achieved – that is, perfect equality of opportunity, it would be unstable; over 
time it would descend into a state of unequal opportunity” (Isbister, p. 8, 2001). In the 
little red hen example, if the other animals are too lazy to help, then they should get less 
bread than the hen because they wouldn’t help her make it. But then the next generation 
may be unable to help the hen make bread, as they are too weak and unhealthy due to the 
decisions of their parents. Thus, Isbister illustrates that if we insist upon equality in one 
dimension, we will inevitably get inequality in another dimension. When people are 
given equal opportunities, they end up with inequalities in wealth because each has 
different personal attributes that help or hinder success. Isbister argues that there is a need 
for government intervention to provide goods and services when the private market fails 
(Isbister, 2001).   
Another problem of distributive justice is determining how much people are 
willing to pay for something. The contingent valuation method used in traditional ex-ante 
cost-benefit analysis poses hypothetical questions to people about how much they would 
be willing to pay to prevent the loss of some particular object.  This is troublesome as 
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contingent valuation has been used legally to measure the actual loss involved and an 
indication of the culpability of the party (Sen 2000).  Moreover, the formal theory of 
traditional ex-ante cost-benefit analysis assumes that each individual has well-defined 
preferences.  This is not necessarily true. As well, traditional ex-ante cost-benefit analysis 
weighs each individual’s preferences equally. It gives large weight to high-income 
individuals who have a greater willingness to pay to accept or disregard policy changes.  
The problem with this is the neglect of distributional issues, both in the form of attaching 
the same weight one everyone’s dollars and in not attaching any weight to distributional 
changes resulting from the program or project. In addition, it is difficult to get people to 
reveal what they are really willing to pay, especially when the question is not followed by 
an actual demand for that payment.  
Benefits and costs of projects are often only given to individuals with standing in 
society.  The poor are often overlooked.  The benefits described in traditional ex-ante cost 
benefit analysis are often couched in general terms such as “growth,” with negative issues 
such as environmental issues and congestion being overlooked.  Often, analysts 
overestimate benefits and underestimate costs. This is particularly true in the realm of 
policy. Mistakes are made as analysts try to measure the benefits and costs of goods that 
are not traded on the open market. It is often highly difficult to predict the ramifications 
of a project. It is impossible to foresee the future and hard to predict how individuals will 
respond to change.  There may be random effects from a project, and thus broad 






 Cost-benefit analysis is based on the economic concept that optimal decisions 
require the decision maker to determine the best use of limited resources among 
competing uses (Levine, 1968).  The main purpose of CBA is to assist in social decision-
making and to facilitate the best allocation of society’s resources.  However, every 
decision presents different issues and implications for how policy analysts use CBA.  
Therefore there is not a “one-size-fits-all” CBA, but actually an array of CBA 
approaches. 
 The following objective function is often used as a starting point: 
 
where BCR is the benefit cost ratio,    is the benefits accrued from the project or policy, 
   is the costs accrued from the project or policy, and r is the interest rate or chosen social 
discount rate.  The policy or project with the highest BCR is chosen. 
The objective function basically implies that an essential step of CBA is to place 
monetary values on inputs (costs) and outcomes (benefits).  The attachment of monetary 
values to outcomes makes it possible to use economic evaluation methods to determine 
whether a particular program or policy offers an overall net gain to society in the sense 




History of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 CBA first became widely used in the United States during the Great 
Depression.  Under Franklin D. Roosevelt, massive public works programs were 
undertaken in an attempt to spur economic growth. The National Planning Board, a board 
set up to implement the New Deal, hired economists to study the economics of planning 
public works.  These economists recommended that the economic benefits provided by 
public works projects be measured in monetary terms where possible (Hufschdmit, 
1988). The question was how to value the social worth or the value of each of the 
individual projects, and CBA offered a more satisfactory test of economic worth than had 
previous methods.  
 Agencies routinely tried to calculate costs and benefits of their activities in 
order to gain continued funding by Congress, especially since the federal court system 
had begun mandating cost-benefit analysis in the 1960s. In 1936, the Flood Control Act 
specified that projects should be undertaken if “the benefits to whomsoever they may 
accrue are in excess of the estimated costs.” The work done by the United States federal 
government in the ‘40s, ‘50s, and ‘60s extended the application of cost-benefit analysis 
beyond water resources to many other public investment programs and to other countries.   
 The 1950s saw the first major economic critiques of CBA (Hufschdmit, 1988). 
The problem is that no formal guidelines had been put forth for conducting analyses, nor 
had there been precise definitions for benefits and costs. For example, is it better to 
perform a CBA of a whole policy or to define all the specific projects involved, do CBA 
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for each project, and then “add up” the CBAs for each project to get the entire policy 
CBA.  Is the additive form even appropriate for CBA?  
 Since a 1981 presidential order, federal agencies have been required to use CBA 
to evaluate past and future government regulations.  Current governmental procedure to 
evaluate regulations is based on private costs, which have no basis in modern applied 
welfare economics (Hazilla and Kopp, 1990). As well, instead of using social costs 
measured as compensating variations, as the theoretical literature proposes, federal 
agencies use annualized engineering costs and consider operating and maintenance 
expenses as equivalent to social cost.  The assumptions underlying CBA must be 
understood as well as the history of the use of CBA. 
 
CBA Assumptions and Their Repercussions 
 
CBA is a method of reaching policy decisions by comparing the economic costs 
of doing something with its benefits; it is rooted in traditional neoclassical economics. It 
sounds simple, but, in practice, it can easily become complicated and is much abused. 
With careful selection of the assumptions used in CBA, it can be made to support or 
oppose almost anything. This is particularly important when the decision being 
contemplated involves some positive or negative externality that is not fully reflected in 
the market price.   Institutional economists criticize neo-classical economists for 
neglecting institutions that affect political problems, enforcement problems, and 
transaction costs that would arise when implementing a policy. These issues are almost 
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entirely overlooked when conducting traditional cost-benefit analysis.  I will identify each 
assumption made in cost-benefit analysis and demonstrate the flaws that are inherent 
when neo-institutional economics is not considered. 
 
Cost-benefit Analysis Assumption: Individuals are rational, self-interested 
 
Socially Formed and Altered Preferences: 
CBA has foundations in public choice theory, which begins with the critical 
assumption that all individuals are driven by the goal of utility maximization (Buchanan, 
1984).  One of the first assumptions of cost-benefit analysis is that the individuals 
involved are rational, self-interested individuals with stable and well-defined preferences.  
This is not necessarily true.   Contrary to a simplistic understanding of neoclassical 
economic assumptions, self-interest does not necessarily mean selfish. Some economic 
models in the field of behavioral economics assume that self-interested individuals 
behave altruistically because they get some benefit, or utility, from doing so (Ariely, 
2009).   As well, behavioral economic literature recognizes that individuals often make 
decisions that “satisfice” (satisfying utility preferences), rather than maximize their 
utility.   
Individuals have preferences and goals, but their preferences and goals are 
influenced or constrained by others’ behavior; Schelling refers to this type of behavior as 
contingent behavior (Schelling, 2006).  Social norms are the behavioral expectations and 
cues within a society or group. This sociological term has been defined as "the rules that 
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a group uses for appropriate and inappropriate values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. 
Individuals conducting or evaluating cost-benefit analysis will take into account the 
preferences of others and will be just as influenced by social norms as market norms such 
as prices and wages.  Furthermore, the preferences of individuals are subject to change 
over time along with the preferences of the people with whom they associate (Ariely, 
2009).  While individuals may exhibit a preference for a certain policy or program to be 
enacted at one point in time, that preference is just as likely to change over time as it is to 
remain stagnant.  This propensity to change challenges the foundation of cost-benefit 
analysis. Preferences may change during the course of a project and may, in fact, be 
influenced by the project itself. Thus, preferences are endogenous.  
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis Assumption: Individuals Identify All Alternative Projects 
 
Availability Heuristic: 
Individuals do not have the cognitive abilities or the time to evaluate all options 
when identifying alternative projects. The assumption that individuals identify all 
alternative projects does not hold with neo-institutional economics. The availability 
heuristic is a predisposition of people to base their judgments on the basis of information 
that is readily available (Matzavinos, 2001).  Often, analysts overestimate benefits and 
underestimate costs. This is particularly true in the realm of policy. Analysts make 
mistakes as they try to measure the benefits and costs of goods that are not traded on the 




Bounded rationality is a theory of human decision-making that assumes that 
people behave rationally, but only within the limits of the information available to them. 
Humans make individual decisions that may appear to be irrational. The problem here is 
that neither decision-makers nor analysts can handle comparisons among a large number 
of alternatives, because resources and cognitive constraints exist.  Thus, the bounded 
rationality assumption of CBA is highly implausible.  Williamson (1981, 553) argues 
that, “Bounded rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex 
problems and in processing information.”  Without the ability to optimize utility in every 
decision, individuals develop a set of second-best decision rules that result in their 
making constrained decisions.   
 
Credible Commitments: 
Costs and benefits are evaluated by looking at the consequences of decisions; this 
criterion allows the consequences to include happiness and fulfillment of desire as well as 
whether certain actions have been performed.  The problem with this approach is that 
there is a lengthy tradition of taking a narrow view of what can count as consequences. In 
addition, explicit valuation of all costs and benefits is difficult to conjecture; it involves 
full explanation of the reasons for making a decision. Public decisions need to be explicit 
as the demands of accountability apply to choices made by project and program planners 
as well as those overseeing implementation (Sen, 2000), so the discrepancy between what 
is needed and what is realistic can be vast.  
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  Montzavinos discusses how economic growth occurs when governments establish 
formal institutions that foster a credible commitment (p 245).  One of the inherent issues 
with policy implementation is that it is difficult to do.  Administrations change and the 
intended effects of the policy, as forecast by cost-benefit analysis, may not have time to 
come to fruition.  There are limits to the ability of governments to make credible 
commitments (Stiglitz), which is sometimes a reason for policy failure. 
 
Cost-benefit Analysis Assumption: Listing the physical impacts of the alternative 
projects; predicting the impact of the project during the life of the project 
 
Meta-Preferences: Formal and Informal Institutions (Social Norms) Matter:  
An individual makes choices in a context of underlying meta-preferences, or 
preferences about preferences – such as ethical values.   As Mantzavinos (2001) 
discusses, these meta-preferences influence choice sets.  North (1990) states that the 
consequent institutional framework limits the choice set of the actors.  Mantzavinos 
(2001, p.83) defines institutions as the “rules of the game” and organizations as 
“corporate actors.” Individuals and groups of individuals establish solutions to common 
social problems and realize social objectives through the institutional environment.  
There is a decrease in costs when individuals have common rules to adhere to (Ostrom, 
1990).  
Given the cognitive constraints of individuals, Hayek (1960, p.66) argues that 
rules (institutions) are the “device we have learned to use because our reason is 
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insufficient to master the full detail of complex reality.” Hayek also states that both the 
formal and informal institutional environments complement each other to provide a 
foundation of rules, norms, values, and conventions that society uses to manage and 
achieve its goals and objectives.  
According to Mantzavinos (2001), the informal institutional environment of a 
society is composed of conventions, moral rules, and social norms. These institutions 
emerge and persist for different reasons and in different ways, but in all societies the 
informal institutional environment is equally important to, if not more important than, 
formal institutions. However, rather than assessing their relative importance, it is more 
instructive to uphold that formal and informal institutions complement and provide 
structure for each other.   
 
Path Dependency: 
Path dependency means that where you have been in the past determines where 
you are now and limits your options for where you can go in future.  It refers to the way 
in which apparently insignificant events and choices can have huge consequences for the 
development of a market or an economy.  Path dependency makes it difficult to consider 






Cost-benefit Analysis Assumption: Choosing the social discount rate and complete 
property rights.  
Time inconsistent Preferences and Asymmetric Information: 
Time-inconsistent preferences occur when individuals put too much weight on the 
present when evaluating the costs and benefits of action (or inaction).  The social 
discount rate brings all past and future costs and benefits to the present.  Choice of the 
social discount rate for cost-benefit analysis is crucial.    Subjectivity of the discount rate 
leads to great inconsistency in the analysis of the efficacy of programs or agencies.  
Because the analyst chooses the social discount rate, CBA is very susceptible to the bias 




Property Rights are essential to a market economy. For a person to trade, he or 
she must know that the person selling the good or service owns it and that ownership will 
pass to the buyer. The stronger and clearer the property rights, the more likely it is that 
trade will take place and that prices will be efficient. If there are no property rights 
pertaining to something, there can be severe consequences such as overuse of a common 
resource or negative externalities.   
When conducting a CBA, researchers typically base decisions on the neoclassical 
assumption that property rights are well defined and complete.  Neo-institutional 
economics recognizes that there will always be incomplete property rights (Barzel, 2002).  
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Actual property rights can be very different from perceived property rights. For example, 
an individual may have the legal rights to property while not holding the ability to 
capitalize on the property.  In other words, the individual does not have the ability to 
consume the property directly thus must consume it indirectly through exchange (Barzel, 
2002).  
 
Pros and Cons of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
In my research, I used secondary data to conduct CBA.  While secondary data is often 
accessible and free to the general public, there are numerous challenges in using it.  It 
took long time periods for me to acquire secondary data. Federal data were obtained, but 
not all that I needed were online or in readily readable formats.  The secondary data 
collected for my research were also two to five years old.  It is difficult for policy-makers 
to base decisions on research conducted with “old” data to solve current problems 
(Young and Ryu, 2001).    
There were advantages to using secondary data for my research.  Data collected 
for one purpose was used to answer questions about another research topic. As Young 
and Ryu note, government-collected secondary data were reliably collected and validated. 
As well, the fact that data were collected for a different purpose reduces the risk of it 





Need for Other Types of Analysis besides Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 CBA is sometimes inadequate to meet the needs of policy analysis. There is often 
a need for other types of policy evaluation in order to fully explain the policy 
implications of an issue.  The use of qualitative research methods to evaluate a policy can 
provide unique and valuable insight that would otherwise be ignored with quantitative 
research.  Qualitative research helps us focus more on the individual rather than just the 
collective. Qualitative research methods are often used “when the scientist is interested in 
obtaining detailed and rich knowledge of a specific phenomenon” (Miller and Salkind, p. 
143, 2002).  Narrative research, ethnography, case studies, phenomenology, and 
grounded theory research are all methodologies and techniques of qualitative research 
that can be used to demonstrate the actual reality of the interviewee in a way that cannot 
be stated in numbers or literal text (Miller and Salkind, 2002).  Each of these five inquiry 
approaches provides a systematic way to conduct qualitative research.  Miller and 
Salkind argue that qualitative research methods are not just another way to answer the 
same research question that could be answered by quantitative research.  Rather, 
qualitative research methods offer a unique approach to answering new and different 
types of questions. 
From qualitative research information, researchers gain a stronger comprehension 
of the audience for which a program is designed.  Qualitative research may involve 
collecting stories of experiences, understanding the experiences surrounding a 
phenomenon, developing a theory grounded in data, describing or interpreting a culture 
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or single case, or developing an in-depth study of multiple cases (Miller and Salkind, 
2002).  The type of closed-ended questions used in quantitative analysis does not address 
all potential costs and benefits that could become evident if qualitative research were 
conducted. 
 There have been many insightful studies of policy formulation and evaluation that 
have engaged in little to no statistical analysis. Quantitative analysis is not always as 
precise as we might hope when it comes to statistical technique, data quality, or reliability 
of results.  Anderson argues that the idea that “policy analysis is worthwhile only when it 
involves the analysis of quantitative data with statistical techniques… should be 
resisted…there is no reason to assume that if something cannot be counted, it does not 
count” (Anderson, 2011).  The quality of the analysis, as well as the cautious and 
thorough use of the data, is more important than whether or not quantitative analysis is 
being used (Anderson, 2011).  
 Some policy initiatives have not lent themselves to scrupulous quantitative 
analysis.  Numerous attributes of social welfare, as well as economic regulatory policy, 
are subject to such difficulties.  The data gained through case studies, interviews, and 
questionnaires often contain precious information which would not otherwise have been 
provided to researchers (Anderson, 2011).  At the same time, researchers using 
interviews and case studies must be cognizant of the need to not ask questions that would 
bias responses.  Furthermore, the people being questioned may have their own agendas 
and biases, so data gained from qualitative research must be checked against other 
sources and used with care just as with quantitative research.   
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 One of the first works published in the field of policy implementation was 
qualitative research, a case study done by Pressman and Wildavsky: “Implementation: 
How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It's Amazing 
that Federal Programs Work at All” (1973).  Federal policy was initiated in Oakland, 
California, to improve economic development.  The authors examine the problems that 
the EDA had in the Oakland case, analyze what happened to cause the program to mostly 
fail, and provide insight into other policy implementation strategies.  Their seminal work 
is a great example of how qualitative research methods can be used to test and develop 
new theories, provide contextual analysis of events, and deliver information to either 
enforce current generalizations or demonstrate deviant examples of our theoretical 
generalizations (Anderson, 2011).   
Qualitative research provides an avenue to test theories and models and generates 
richer and more fully developed descriptions of the target population (Brannen, 1992; 
Thomas, 2006).   Scholars often discuss the large divide between quantitative and 
qualitative social science methodologies.  In order to bridge this gap, numerous scholars 
have advocated the use of quantitative and qualitative methods in tandem.  
Methodological triangulation – where one method is used to complement the other – has 
been touted since the 1970s (Denzin, 2004).  The use of both qualitative and quantitative 
methodology seems to give the most effective interpretation of the research.  For 
example, the majority of quantitative interviews typically contain at least one open-ended 
question.  Phone interviews could be conducted with qualitative research techniques such 
as probing in order to gain more specific information than a typical quantitative interview 
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would garner (Grim, Harmon, and Gromis, 2006).   Incorporating qualitative research 
into policy analysis makes the results easier for a lay-person to comprehend.  Some 
stakeholders are more likely to respond to numbers while others are more likely to 
respond when presented with qualitative interpretation (Grim, Harmon, and Gromis, 
2006).   
 
A Unique Approach to Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 Historically, no research has considered CBA as consisting of four cases.  A 
primary objective of my research is to define and consider four types of CBA: 1) 
Traditional CBA Ex-Ante, 2) Traditional CBA Ex-Post, 3) Empirical Ex-Ante, 4) 
Empirical Ex-Post.  The varying assumptions and data requirements of CBA are to be 
discussed in detail below in the following sections.   
 
Traditional ex-ante cost-benefit analysis 
 
Traditional ex-ante cost-benefit analysis occurs before policy-makers decide 
whether or not to take on a proposed project.  The first step is identifying the set of 
alternative projects.  The problem here is that neither decision-makers nor analysts can 
handle comparisons among a large number of alternatives, because resources and 
cognitive constraints exist.  Thus, analysts must decide which benefits and costs should 
be included, which means selection bias can be an issue. The next steps of traditional 
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cost-benefit analysis include listing the physical impacts of the alternative projects, 
predicting the impact of the project during the life of the project, attaching dollar values 
to the predicted impacts, aggregating the costs and benefits that arise over different years 
by discounting the future benefits and costs to obtain their present value, and, finally, 
choosing the social discount rate.  The problems inherent in the assumptions of traditional 
cost-benefit analysis, such as path dependency and availability heuristic, were discussed 
earlier in this chapter. 
 
Traditional ex-post cost-benefit analysis 
 
Traditional ex-post cost-benefit analysis occurs after all the impacts of the 
implemented project have been realized.  The steps of ex-post cost-benefit analysis 
involve the same steps as traditional ex-ante cost-benefit analysis except that this analysis 
involves computing the net present value of each alternative.  If the net present value is 
greater than zero, the project exhibits positive returns.   
As time (t) in the benefit-cost ratio formula increases, the variance of the estimate 
of the present values of net benefits will decrease. It will never equal zero because 
uncertainty, while reduced, is never gone. Error of traditional cost-benefit analysis can be 
decreased by obtaining and estimating net benefits at different times.  This will provide a 
clue to the magnitude of the different types of traditional cost-benefit analysis forecasting 
error.  Furthermore, the market approach to traditional cost-benefit analysis provides 
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sensitivity to individual preferences, which is relevant for efficiency considerations (Sen, 
2000). 
 
Pros and Cons of Traditional CBAs 
 
The pros and cons for traditional ex-ante and traditional ex-post CBA are 
relatively similar.  The only real difference is that fewer assumptions will be made about 
impact in traditional ex-post, as more information is available to measure project impact.  
Researchers might have survey results from the affected population to use to quantify 
impact, rather than simply making assumptions based on how many people were affected.  
The positive outcomes of both traditional analyses are numerous.  Both types of 
traditional CBA provide a starting point from which to begin the evaluation of a project.  
Furthermore, both approaches force project advocates and opponents to provide 
quantitative data to back up qualitative arguments. They are also useful because they 
allow comparisons to be made between investments or projects. Since all investments are 
evaluated using the same method, the comparison process is easier.  
There are many disadvantages to traditional ex-ante and ex-post CBA.  These two 
approaches assume complete knowledge, requiring that each alternative project be 
identified and known.  The problem with this assumed completeness is that it is nearly 
impossible to compare every alternative with every other, especially since so many 
considerations are involved (see discussion of bounded rationality and availability 
heuristic made previously in chapter).  The presumption of full knowledge of the 
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consequences and alternatives is implausible.  There are always going to be sources of 
ambiguity, and these could have far-reaching effects (Sen, 2000). 
Once costs and benefits have been defined, controversy arises over what type of 
loss function to use for the computation of both. In statistics and decision theory, a loss 
function maps an event onto a real number intuitively representing some “cost” 
associated with the event. Additive accounting is the most common technique because it 
is simple; it simply deducts costs from benefits. But multiplicative forms have also been 
used (John Nash), and there has also been a strong case made for concave functions that 
respond positively to benefits and negatively to costs (Kuhn-Tucker Theorem) (Baguley, 
2004). The debate over what kind of algebraic form for the loss function to use for 
calculating net benefits is a major challenge to using either type of traditional CBA.   
An additional concern that ethicists have disputed is the fundamental utilitarian 
assumptions of traditional ex-ante and ex-post CBAs which states that the sum of 
individual utilities should be maximized because it is possible to trade off utility gains for 
utility losses for others. In essence, ethicists are critical of the theory that many CBA 
proponents advocate, that any policy that makes the economic pie larger should be 
followed, without considering the distribution of those costs and benefits.   
Furthermore, traditional ex-ante and ex-post CBAs are criticized for treating risks 
to health and safety as commodities; they list all alternatives in terms of money, thus 
treating all goods as replaceable with other goods (Graham, 1981). Traditional CBAs also 
favor projects whose net present value is greater than zero, but use of the net present 
value may not be the most efficient allocation of resources because the cost-benefit 
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analyst may not have taken all alternative projects into consideration (see discussion of 
bounded rationality).  
Bureaucrats and political processes have a big influence on traditional 
approaches.  This is not an ideal situation because political and bureaucratic actors, 
especially policy entrepreneurs, tend to overestimate the benefits of their favored 
alternative and underestimate the benefits of alternatives they do not favor for the sake of 
convincing others to agree with them. As well, governments usually only include benefits 
and costs to their residents, ignoring benefits and costs that occur in adjoining countries.  
Traditional approaches are also very expensive. For example, in 1992, a traditional ex-
post cost-benefit analysis conducted to investigate the use of lead in gasoline cost the 
EPA nearly $1 million. 
Traditional ex-ante cost-benefit analysis has a unique problem with the Pareto 
welfare criterion.  The Pareto welfare criterion states that any given social policy cannot 
be put into action unless at least someone will be made better off and no one worse off, or 
unless those who are made worse off are compensated for their loss.  Hubin (1994) 
argues that because CBA is committed to the potential Pareto improvement criterion, 
CBA does not give the appropriate consideration to distributive justice or 
intergenerational equity.  
 A final issue in traditional CBAs is that there are numerous problems in 
measuring gains – the value-added to stakeholders from the policy – and losses from the 
negative impact. Individuals have different preferences, valuations of goods and services, 
and opportunity costs; individuals also monetize impacts and choose discount rates 
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differently (see earlier discussion of meta-preferences).  People typically want more 
compensation for a loss (willingness to accept compensation for a proposed change- 
WTA) than they would have paid for a gain (willingness to pay for a proposed change- 
WTP) (Hubin, 1994).  When compensating with money for a policy change, money may 
not fully compensate the individual for losses that cannot be translated into monetary 
terms (Goodin, 1995). Furthermore, happiness and utility are difficult yardsticks by 
which to measure, and they vary from person to person.    
 
Empirical (Regression) Approaches to Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
The empirical ex-ante and ex-post approaches involve isolating the population 
that is going to be impacted by the policy and determining the true effect of the policy on 
the population using statistical techniques, mainly through regression analysis. The 
approach still asks whether the benefits of the policy at hand outweigh the costs. It also 
asks, if a policy is to be put in place, how much implementation will be necessary?  What 
form of implementation should it take? How large scale should the policy be? These 
approaches had not been implemented in many CBA studies.    
One CBA that used the empirical ex-ante approach was “Regression modeling 
and meta-analysis for decision making: a cost-benefit analysis of incentives in telephone 
surveys” (Gelman, Stevens, and Chan 2003).  It used regression techniques to measure 
the relationship between the level of the incentive (the policy) on the x-axis and the 
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number of people taking a telephone survey on the y-axis.  No other studies were 
identified that used an empirical CBA approach. 
Empirical ex-ante and ex-post cost-benefit analyses, or social return on 
investment, are new ways of demonstrating the value of a policy.  There are numerous 
positives to the ex-ante empirical approach, and at first glance it appears to be a relatively 
easy approach to take. The ex-ante empirical approach is also useful because it helps us 
determine which among a series of responses a policy might impact, and it allows the 
choice of which responses to target in order to garner the largest amount of impact.  
The strength of the ex-post empirical approach is that it is able to quantify the 
impact of the policy using statistical techniques.  This leaves the analysis less room for 
subjectivity than do traditional ex-ante and ex-post approaches.  The biggest disadvantage 
to the ex-post empirical approach is that it is extremely difficult to isolate the population 
the policy has reached.  
 
Cases Through Which to Test Cost-Benefit Analysis Approaches 
 
 My study uses two distinct cases, each of which has far reaching policy 
implications. The chosen cases can be examined through either traditional or empirical 
CBA.  The first case, the Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program, is a food 
policy issue.  Implemented in 1968, it has a long history and has only recently begun to 
be evaluated.  It also has wide breadth in that the federally funded program is 
 
 30 
administered in nearly every state. It is supposed to lead to improvements in nutrition and 
health, resulting in lower rates of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, obesity, etc.   
 Since its conception, there have been millions of participants in the EFNEP 
program.  There are large amounts of data produced by the Center for Disease Control on 
the rates of different types of diseases and conditions over time.  Data on the number of 
participants and information on the socio-demographic characteristics of EFNEP 
participants are also available. It appeared that this would be a relatively straightforward 
situation in which to perform empirical ex-post CBA.  
 The second case involves public health.  Child immunization is a public health 
issue that has widespread ramifications on stability of a developed country. As children 
are required in the United States to get immunizations before starting public education, 
and the National Institute of Health does yearly surveys on childhood immunization and 
therefore data were readily available on which children in the United States were getting 
immunized. Billions of dollars in public and private funds are spent each year trying to 
incentivize parental guardians to vaccinate their children.  Numerous studies have been 
done on the effects of policies to incentivize parents to vaccinate their children against 
childhood diseases such as polio and the measles.  
 My study will attempt to evaluate each case using the four different types of 
CBA. Ideally, the results will yield conclusions that can assist policy-makers in the 






A POLICY EVALUATION OF  
THE EXPANDED FOOD AND NUTRITION EDUCATION PROGRAM 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of one of the major nutrition policy 
programs in the United States – the Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program 
(EFNEP).  EFNEP is a federally funded program designed to help limited-resource 
homemakers acquire the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and practices necessary for 
establishing a sound diet for themselves and their families, with the long-term goal of 
generally improved health and disease prevention.    A major drawback to effective 
evaluation of the policy is that the effectiveness is confounded with the implementation 
of the policy.   
Research on the role of implementation on policy effectiveness has a rich history.  
In the 1970s, it became clear that implementation was a problem across all levels of 
government.  Implementation issues have historically been ignored in theories of 
government action, but over time researchers have learned that agents do not always 
perform as instructed, and scholars have found “that the consequences of even the best 
planned, best supported, and most promising policy initiatives depend finally on what 
happens as individuals throughout the policy system interpret and act on them” 
(McLaughlin, 1987).   
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How the EFNEP program is implemented varies widely from state to state.  The 
role of implementation on policy effectiveness is very important in the context of EFNEP 
for two reasons: first, it is very difficult to make policy implementation successful across 
varying levels of government; and second, policy implementation and outcome success 
depend on local and regional factors such as dedication, capability, and the intricacy of 
institutions (McLaughlin, 1987). EFNEP is more successful in some states than others 
due to local and regional factors.  Extra funding to an institution can help a program’s 
successful implementation, but dedication to the program is hard to legislate, so 
determining which programs should receive funding is a complex challenge. While 
EFNEP has received federal funding since 1968, an economic evaluation of the program 
did not take place until 2002 (Rajgopal, 2002). The primary objective of my research is to 
use different approaches to CBA to determine the actual benefit to individuals and 
society of EFNEP.  Before discussing the different types of CBA, I will clarify the 
difference in CBA and CEA (cost-effectiveness analysis). 
 
Quantitative Analysis of Health Policy Implementation and Evaluation: CBA v. CEA 
 
There are two major types of quantitative analyses used to evaluate health policy: 
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  Cost-benefit analysis 
is used less frequently in the health sector because many scholars are apprehensive about 
assigning monetary value to the outcomes, quality of life (health) and life years, both of 
which are highly subjective.   
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CEA compares different kinds of interventions in terms of the incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (ICER).  ICER is the net cost to achieve a given unit of health, such as 
deaths prevented or life-years saved (Medeiros, Butkus, Chipman, Cox, Jones, and Little, 
2005). CEA has become common in medical journals, but politicians in the United States 
have shown little support for its use in funding decisions.  As a result, economic 
assessments of the performance of government programs are often of questionable 
quality, not used by policy-makers, or not conducted at all.  Additionally, lack of time 
and funding for conducting these assessments and disincentives for sponsoring program 
assessment can be barriers to nutrition program evaluation (Grosse, Teutsch, and Haddix, 
2007).  In order to understand best understand the use of CBA and CEA, a discussion of 




Researchers have traditionally assumed that the agents implementing and 
receiving the nutrition policies of ENFEP are rational individuals who are trying to 
maximize their own self-interests. In recent years, however, researchers have 
demonstrated this assumption does not always hold.  In order for EFNEP to be more 
effective, policy implementers must realize the “bounded rationality” evident in their 
audience. Many of EFNEP recipients are bound by societal constraints such as poverty 
and limited education that may prove insurmountable when it comes to nutrition policies; 
i.e., recipients may lack the skills to budget money, read food labels, and perform other 
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life skills that the EFNEP programming promotes.  Since the 1980s, researchers 
investigating EFNEP have found that many EFNEP recipients were indeed trying to 
maximize their own self-interest but without the crucial realization that self-interest 
included their health.   
The fact that the effectiveness of EFNEP is confounded by the factors discussed 
above makes it difficult to perform a proper assessment of EFNEP with CBA.  This may 
be one of the reasons that so little CBA of EFNEP had been done.   
 
Traditional Ex-ante Cost-Benefit Analysis of EFNEP 
 
For the traditional ex-ante CBA of EFNEP, direct benefits from the program will 
be measured as costs avoided or delayed as a result of positive changes made by 
participants.  Indirect benefits will be measured as the monetary benefits accruing to 
society on account of increased productivity of workers who have improved health, 
longer life spans, and a reduction in lost work time.  Some of the intangible or 
immeasurable benefits from the program are employability, self-esteem, and quality of 
life. The direct program costs are the actual expenditures for resources used in program 
implementation, such as salaries, equipment, travel and materials.  The indirect costs will 
be measured as unintended expenditures such as value of participants’ time lost from 
work and the cost of pain and discomfort that participants suffer (Rajgopal et al, 2002).   
While economic evaluations of public health interventions had been taking place 
for years in other health arenas, until 2002 there were no economic evaluations of 
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nutrition education policy. Researchers in Virginia decided to conduct a traditional ex-
ante CBA of Virginia EFNEP to clarify the health benefits potentially resulting from the 
program.  Before the Virginia study, the cost efficiency of the EFNEP program had not 
been evaluated (Rajgopal et al, 2002).   
A single measure of cost-effectiveness as net-present value was calculated in 
addition to numerous other efficiency measures (Burney and Haughton, 2002).  The 
initial benefit/cost ratio of $10.64/$1.00 indicates that, for every dollar spent on the 
Virginia EFNEP program, the potential exists that over 10 dollars may be saved in future 
healthcare costs (Rajgopal et al, 2002, 34).  
In 2002, Tennessee conducted a traditional ex-post CBA of the nutrition 
education program EFNEP.  This study was the first to use an experimental group as well 
as a control group. Tennessee researchers found that subjects in both groups saved money 
on average family food expenditures (Burney and Haughton, 2002). This study showed a 
significant improvement in food resource management and nutrient intake for the 
experimental group, which had received the EFNEP nutrition education, compared to the 
control group.   
No studies have been published that examine the retention of EFNEP lessons for 
more than a five-year period. This limited time frame may fail to capture the long-term 
costs and benefits that might alter the benefit/cost ratio. Additional CBAs of other 
nutrition programs are needed to establish the monetary value of certain benefits such as 
prevention of chronic disease.  
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Evaluation of the EFNEP program is especially important as this programming 
addresses an underserved population that is more likely to have poor eating habits and be 
at risk for a much higher incidence rate of chronic disease. In order to determine whether 
EFNEP really can demonstrate benefits such as prevention of chronic disease, scholars 
must continue to monitor participants. Long term evaluation will determine if the learned 
nutrition behavior persists.  A longitudinal study demonstrating the validity of the 
EFNEP program among participants would also provide a stronger incentive to continue 
the funding of this national program. There are differences in how the program is 
administered in different states. The literature has yet to evaluate the federally funded 
program as a nation, which is the gap that my research hopes to fill. 
 
Traditional Ex-post Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
In order to conduct a traditional ex-post CBA for 2007-2009 federal data, my 
research has followed the methodology set forth by the VA study (Rajgopal, 2002).    
My first step was to identify behaviors taught in EFNEP that are assumed to 
contribute to the delay or avoidance of diet-related chronic diseases and conditions that 
are prevalent among low-income individuals. The direct tangible benefits of EFNEP are 
characterized as dollars saved on healthcare costs by the assumed delay/avoidance of the 
onset of chronic diseases and conditions.   
EFNEP has been shown to have positive cost-benefit ratios based on potential 
prevention of diet-related chronic diseases and conditions (Rajgopal et al, 2002).  Many 
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of the practices learned in EFNEP change lifestyle choices that would otherwise have led 
to hypertension, diabetes, or high blood pressure.  Chronic diseases and health conditions 
cost society an estimated $250 billion each year in medical charges and loss of 
productivity.  The degree to which these costs might be reduced by healthy eating 
patterns cannot be calculated precisely.  Nonetheless, numerous scholars such as 
Dollahite and Hershey (2001) have estimated that a proper diet might forestall at least 20 
percent of the annual deaths from heart disease, cancer, and diabetes.  Other studies have 
demonstrated that 50 percent of chronic disease mortality can be attributed to changeable 
lifestyle factors, such as diet (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
1990).    
The behaviors taught in EFNEP are designed to improve participants’ food 
security, food resource management, and food nutrient value.  EFNEP enrollees are 
taught to make their own meals at home, avoid convenience store and fast foods, read 
labels, etc.  In order to measure whether these skills do in fact increase food security, 
food management, and food nutrition value, the traditional ex-post CBA approach I will 
take will be to test the mean change in pre- and post-scores on the EFNEP behavior 
checklist.  The food behavior checklist has questions related to food security, food 
resource management, and food nutrition value (Radimer, 1990).   A copy of this 






Food Security in EFNEP 
 
Adequate food security is defined as “access by all people to enough food for an 
active, healthy life” (Campbell, 1991, 408), as well as the ability to acquire food in 
socially acceptable ways (e.g., not through theft or begging).   Food security means 
having a diet with sufficient energy and nutritional quality to prevent malnutrition and 
limited activity level.  Previous approaches have demonstrated the effectiveness of 
ENFEP implementation on food security, but only on the state level. This research will 
utilize national data. The Dollahite (2001) study found that race/ethnic group, age, and 
place of residence were significantly associated with change in food security score from 
pre- to post-test.  Graduates’ food security scores increased significantly over the scores 
of terminated participants.  This indicates that education can increase food security even 
in the presence of economic limitations.  My first formal research hypothesis is: 
H1: If individuals participate in EFNEP, then graduates will experience greater 
food security than non-EFNEP participant graduates. 
 
Food Resource Management Component of EFNEP 
 
One of the main purposes of the ENFEP program is to help people learn to utilize 
their income in ways that maximize their food’s nutritional value.  Previous studies, such 
as a study by Hershey (2001), focused on evaluating the food resource management 
success of EFNEP participants.  Food resource management is the ability to compare 
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prices and plan ahead so as to avoid running out of food before the end of every month. 
Food resource management is an important tool as many EFNEP participants are on food 
stamps and often run out of food assistance funds by the end of the first week of the 
month. 
Researchers assume that before starting nutrition education programming through 
EFNEP, most of these households were running out of food by the end of the month 
because they had not learned the necessary skills.  Hence, my next hypothesis is: 
H2: If individuals participate in EFNEP, then participant graduates will experience 
more food resource management success than non-EFNEP participant graduates. 
 
Nutrient Uptake Component of EFNEP 
 
Many participants in ENFEP do not understand how to monitor fat, salt, or sugar 
intake. Many suffer from poor nutrition, either in the form of malnourishment or obesity.  
Research shows that healthier nutrient intake leads to longer, more productive living.  
Often, healthier nutrient intake is learned through engaging in better food shopping 
practices, such as looking at nutrition labels or planning meals ahead of time.  Before my 
work, studies have shown that women who said they almost always used nutrition facts 
on food labels had a much lower consumption of fat grams and higher consumption of 
vitamins than those who did not or seldom used nutrition facts. Food shopping practices 
can influence nutrient intake in low-income households and are key topics to nutrient 
education (Murphy, 1998).  As a result, it would be useful to determine whether receiving 
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an EFNEP education leads to healthier nutrient intake.  Accordingly, my study 
hypothesizes:  
H3: If individuals participate in EFNEP, then participant graduates will engage in 




My research utilizes national level EFNEP data collected from the federal EFNEP 
headquarters in Washington, D.C.  Currently, the ENFEP program operates in all fifty 
states, as well as in American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The 
goal of the program is for participants to be able to improve their diet, increase their 
knowledge of essential human nutrition, increase ability to buy food that satisfies 
nutritional needs, improve food production practice, and increase ability to manage food 
budgets (United States Department of Agriculture, 2010).   
My research focuses on adult, rather than younger, EFNEP participants.  These 
participants are low-income homemakers who are responsible for the planning and 
preparation of their household’s food (State Extension Plan of Work, 1983). Participants 
gain new skills in food production, safety, and sanitation.  There are roughly 3,000 
EFNEP participants per state each year (United States Department of Agriculture, 2010).  
EFNEP is often delivered in a sequence of ten to twelve lessons over several 
months.  The program is delivered by county extension and consumer professionals who 
train the peer educators and volunteers who teach the EFNEP lessons.  Since the peer 
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educators are normally located in the same or nearby communities as the program 
attendees, EFNEP referrals are often made from current or previous participants, as well 
as local schools, churches, health centers, non-profits, and government assistance 
programs.  Program instruction varies by state but includes and is not limited to: 
mailings, mass media efforts, and direct teaching in groups or one-on-one (United States 
Department of Agriculture, 2010).   
The time period for my study is 2007-2009.  The response variable used to 
measure EFNEP success was the food behavior score number of the participant.  The 
predictor variable was EFNEP intervention (pre and post).  The behavior score was based 
on the self-reported items from a federally mandated EFNEP Food Behavior Checklist.  
The checklist uses ten questions designed to evaluate food resource management, food 
safety, and nutrition practices.  Each question is answered on a 1-5 scale: 1= Do not do, 
2=Seldom, 3= Sometimes, 4= Most of the time, 5=Almost always.  The food behavior 
checklist is measured pre- and post-policy.  The three hypotheses were addressed by 
comparing the means of participants test scores pre- and post-EFNEP.   
There are actually three different statistical approaches to comparing pre- and 
post-test means while correcting for differences among participants and co-variation of 
pre and post results within a participant.   First, a dependent T-test could be computed.  
Second, a two-way Analysis of Variance with factors of participant and time could be 
computed.  Finally, regression analysis could be used to regress the test scores onto 
dummy-coded variables for participant and time.  Of these three approaches, this study 
uses the dependent t-test approach.   The statistical significance level is set at α < 0.05.   
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Hypothesis 1 utilizes the responses from question 3 on the survey:  “How often do 
you run out of food before the end of the month?” Hypothesis 2 utilizes the responses 
from question 1 on the survey: “How often do you plan meals ahead of time?”  
Hypothesis 3 utilizes the responses from question 9 on the survey: “How often do you 
look at food labels?”  These were chosen by the preeminent Virginia EFNEP study 
(through factor analysis and consultation with medical experts) as questions that best 




My first hypothesis (EFNEP participants increased food security) was not 
supported by the data (see table 1 below). The mean change in the response after the 
program was 0.5, which shows that participants felt less food secure after program 
completion.  There is not sufficient evidence to conclude that EFNEP participant 
graduates increased food security after the program.  
Table 1:  
 Q3 of entry Q3 of exit t-ratio P value 
Mean 3.3867816873 3.8686455645 -88.41388088 <.0001 
Standard 
error 




Table 2 shows the results from the analysis of the second hypothesis.  Hypothesis 
two was supported by the data.  There is sufficient evidence that EFNEP participant 
graduates increased food resource management.  
Table 2: 
 Q1 of entry Q1 of exit t-ratio P value 
Mean 2.9180817824 3.735090341 157.47930089 <.0001 
Standard error 0.0051880378 0.0051880378   
 
Table 3 shows the results from the analysis of hypothesis 3 (EFNEP participants 
will engage in healthier nutrient intake).  Hypothesis 3 was supported by the data.  There 
is a significant difference between the distributions of the means, so there is sufficient 
evidence that EFNEP participant graduates engaged in healthier nutrient intake.  
Table 3: 
 Q9 of entry Q9 of exit t-ratio P value 
Mean 2.3661730743 3.4418149708 -197.5976525 <.0001 









Empirical Ex-post Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
I did not perform an empirical ex-ante CBA performed as the program was 
already in existence.  The goal of my empirical ex-post CBA study was to determine 
whether the EFNEP program in each state is actually decreasing the rate of chronic 
disease or improving the condition of participants in that state.  My approach was to 
develop a model that relates the dependent variable (disease rate) to the independent 
variable (EFNEP participation rate) in a simple linear fashion.  The form of this model 
was  
                 
where   = disease rate for the ith unit (i.e., the rate of a certain disease for the EFNEP 
eligible population in a certain state; 
  = the intercept (i.e., the rate of a certain disease in a certain state when none of the 
EFNEP eligible population participants are in EFNEP); 
  = the slope (i.e., the change in the rate of a certain disease in a certain state as EFNEP 
participation increases by one percent); 
  = EFNEP participation rate for a certain state; and 
  = residual. 
Basic regression techniques could be used to determine the following hypothesis: 
if the disease rate is related to EFNEP participation, the slope of the regression equation 
will be non-zero.  Of particular interest is if the slope is negative, indicating that EFNEP 
participation is related to a reduced disease rate. 
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Previous traditional ex-ante and ex-post cost-benefit analysis studies of EFNEP 
suggested that EFNEP instruction should result in the decrease or prevention of various 
chronic diseases in the participants, but the only measurement used was the behavior test 
score. Therefore, an important step in increasing the efficacy of empirical ex-post CBA is 
to determine valid and reliable measures of participation (the percentage of eligible 
people in the state who participated in EFNEP) and chronic disease rates in EFNEP 
eligible populations (the percentage of people who have the chronic disease in question 
who were eligible for and participated in EFNEP). Finding valid and reliable data on 
these variables for this study proved extremely difficult. While the number of EFNEP 
participants in each state is readily available, information on the total number of 
individuals eligible for EFNEP is unavailable.   
Definitions of poverty vary widely among states, the common thread being that 
participants are living in poverty.  Therefore the first step was to use the CDC’s 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System to measure the number of individuals 
eligible for EFNEP.   The state of Iowa targets “low-resource individuals with children 
under the age of 10” for participation (Iowa EFNEP Website).  The state of Connecticut 
targets “families with young children with incomes at or below 125% of the federal 
poverty level or with other resource limitations such as poor housing, inadequate access 
to food, limited reading skills, or physical disability” (Connecticut EFNEP Website). 
Ultimately, this step did not work well because eligibility through poverty hinges on 
several aspects beyond income alone.   
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A second step was to use the United States Census Bureau Current Population 
Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplements from 2005 and 2006 and the American 
Community Survey of 2005. The Census Bureau provides the percentage of individuals 
living in poverty categorized by state.  The Census Bureau uses a set of income 
thresholds that vary by family size and composition to determine who is in poverty. 
If a family's total income is less than the family's income threshold, then that 
family and every individual in it is considered to be living in poverty. The official 
poverty thresholds do not vary geographically, but they are updated for inflation using 
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). The official poverty definition uses income before taxes 
and does not include capital gains or non-cash benefits (such as public housing, 
Medicaid, and food stamps) (United States Census Bureau, 2005). The Census Bureau 
data provides poverty as a percentage for each state in 2005. The number of people in the 
state was then multiplied by the percentage in poverty to estimate the number of eligible 
people in poverty in each state in a given year.  From there, the number of participants in 
EFNEP each year was divided by the number of people in poverty in the state to estimate 
the independent variable (the percentage of people in poverty who participated in 
EFNEP).  
The next step to determining the potential EFNEP population was to use the 
population of people in each state who are Medicaid recipients.  Medicaid is health 
insurance that helps many people who can't afford medical care pay for some or all of 
their medical bills. Medicaid is available only to people with limited income, and thus it 
is a good proxy for the EFNEP-eligible population in each state (United States 
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Department of Health and Human Services, 2011).  It was easy to find data for the 
percentage of people in each state who are on Medicaid. That percentage was then 
multiplied by the total population in the state to get the number of Medicaid recipients. 
My study uses the number of people in EFNEP in the state divided by the number of 
people in Medicaid, which is thought to be a good estimate of EFNEP percentage.   
Finding valid and reliable dependent variables (the rate of diagnosis of the chronic 
disease) eligible for EFNEP also proved difficult.  My first step for finding valid and 
reliable dependent variables was to multiply the chronic disease diagnosis/incidence rate 
by the number of people in poverty in the state to get the number of people EFNEP 
eligible who would get a certain chronic disease.   This step did not work because there 
was too much variation.  My second step was to assume that the incidence/diagnosis rate 
for each chronic disease or condition was the same for the poverty/low-income 
population of the state as the general population of the state.   
My next step was to determine if the simple model could be improved by 
including other independent variables to reduce errors and missing variable bias.  The 
independent variables considered to improve the model can be divided into three basic 
categories. The first category is access to healthcare in the state, with variables of 
percentage growth in healthcare spending, federally qualified health centers, healthcare 
employment as a percentage, healthcare spending as percentage of Gross State Product, 
healthcare spending per capita, registered nurses per 100,000 people, and the percentage 
of health expenditures on hospitals.   
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The second category is wealth or lack of wealth in the state.  The variables used to 
measure wealth or lack of included the uninsured poor, the percentage of people who 
could not see a doctor because of cost, dentists per 1,000 people, retail drugs filled per 
capita, the number of people in the population who are underserved, the infant mortality 
rate, fruit and vegetable consumption, preterm birth percentage, uninsured population, 
and life expectancy.   
The third category is the level of healthcare education that the people in the state 
obtained.  The variables used to measure healthcare education include poor mental health 
as a percentage of the population, overweight children, adults who exercise, smokers, and 
teen birth rate.  All independent and dependent variables were collected from either the 
Kaiser State Health Facts website or the Center for Disease Control.   
The independent variables were also crossed with the EFNEP participation rate 
(i.e. interaction) to allow for changes in the relationship of EFNEP and disease as the 
additional independent variables changed.  For example, if the importance of EFNEP 
increases as the value of an independent variable decreases, then the two variables should 
probably form an interaction term.  The only disease rate that was significantly related to 
the EFNEP percentage was obesity.  EFNEP was only significant if the model included 
additional terms and interactions.   
Finally, the models should be compared over time and not just across states (i.e., 
longitudinal modeling).  This approach made many regression assumptions including 






The traditional ex-ante and ex-post approaches are easy to argue for, as they show 
the importance of EFNEP.  The empirical ex-post approach has proven a much more 
difficult approach to take to demonstrate the importance of EFNEP.  Finding valid and 
reliable independent and dependent variables was difficult, as was developing a model 
incorporating other independent variables, interactions, and time. 
My study demonstrates a positive cost-benefit ratio for the federal EFNEP 
program.  This indicates significant returns from dollars spent on the EFNEP program.  
The sensitivity analyses show the range of the cost-benefit ratios to some of the 
assumptions, and the estimates agree with the high figures found by the Virginia EFNEP 
study ($10.64/$1.00).  Finding a favorable benefit/cost ratio lends weight to efforts to 
increase funding for such nutrition education programs in order to ultimately achieve 
savings in healthcare costs. 
Further policy research should also take into account issues of distribution of 
benefits and costs.  In a wealthy and developed country such as the United States, poor 
nutrition is nearly always associated with financial constraint.  Many nutrition scholars 
argue that policy not only needs to be cost-effective, but also must reach underserved 
populations.  Many nutrition programs have not yet been evaluated on these criteria.   
Research on the effectiveness of programs such as EFNEP is one way to ensure 
that social assistance programs serve the needs of those who suffer food insecurity.  Also, 
the consequences of food insecurity such as malnutrition and mental well-being reduce 
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the individual’s ability to be a productive member of society individuals are able to make.  
Obesity, for example, is a national issue right now, yet many Americans do not 
understand that malnutrition in an industrialized, developed society includes a much more 
complex set of issues and consequences than it does in a society such as Ethiopia, where 
food is legitimately scarce.  In the United States, an individual can be “obese and 
undernourished in terms of micronutrients at the same time” (Graham 1985).   
Finally, the opportunity cost of policy is the value of other programs and services 
foregone by the use of the taxpayers’ monetary and physical resources. For example, a 
potential health policy might not be funded because financial resources were given to 
another program with more prominent interest groups. More CBA should be performed 
in response to health policy analysis (Grosse, Teutsch, and Haddix, 2007).  Making 
assumptions explicit and developing the epidemiologic, statistical, and economic capacity 
to prepare the analyses can lead to more informed decisions, with increasing capacity 
leading to better policy decision-making by policy creators over time. 
The results of my study are particularly relevant in today’s political climate due to 
increased general awareness of healthcare costs.  Further policy research should also take 














AN EVALUATION OF THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF  
IMMUNIZATION OF PRESCHOOL AGE CHILDREN 
 
Immunizations have historically been an important component of healthcare for 
children in the United States, but the cultural consensus that immunizations are good for 
children has been eroding. Two important factors in this erosion are 1) many families are 
no longer personally acquainted with mortality of the diseases the immunizations prevent, 
and 2) certain organizations have publicized potential negative health consequences of 
immunization for children. The consequence of this erosion is that immunization rates 
among preschool-age children have been falling. It has been estimated that fewer than 50 
percent of two-year-olds in the United States are fully immunized against deadly 
childhood diseases such as measles, polio, mumps, rubella, tetanus, and whooping cough 
(Khaleghian and Gupta, 2005).  The 1989 measles epidemic occurred in areas of the 
country where the percentage of fully vaccinated children was only 17 percent (Forbes, 
2005).  
Both outcome- and behavior-based policies have been utilized as a means to 
increase the immunization of preschool-age children in the United States.  For example, a 
child must receive a list of immunizations prior to attending public pre-school or any 
grade higher.  However, because of loopholes and lack of compliance, this policy does 
not result in all public school children being vaccinated (Forbes, 2005). The question 
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remains: what is the best policy for the government of the United States to use in 
increasing the percentage of immunized children?   
 An overall objective of this chapter is to use CBA to evaluate how efficient 
immunization policies are in increasing immunization percentages.  However, to use 
CBA, immunizations must be defined in economic and policy terms.  The following 
section discusses immunization in terms of 1) a public good, 2) a policy issue, 3) 
principal-agent applications, and 4) pay for performance contracts. 
 
Public Good Characteristics of Immunizations 
 
 A public good is both non-rival, i.e. consumption by one person does not restrict 
consumption by another, and non-excludable, i.e. the benefits of the good accrue to the 
entire population and cannot be restricted to a particular individual or group.  Vaccination 
coverage of children has an important public good dimension, because one child’s 
immunization precipitates health benefits for others (Khaleghian and Gupta, 2005). 
Immunizations are a merit good – having both public and private good 
characteristics – and this has a large impact on how they should be financed and 
delivered to society (Zhou et al, 2005). Merit goods are goods that everyone should have 
regardless of ability to pay.  Incentives for development of vaccines are needed for 
research and development to occur because providers will not recoup the true marginal 
costs.  Families also have disincentives to bear the time and monetary cost of vaccination: 
those choosing not to immunize reap the benefit of protection created by those who do, 
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but the greater the number of unvaccinated children, the greater the chances of disease 
transmission (Zhou et al, 2005).  Public financing and provision help to overcome these 
problems and ensure an optimal level of service delivery.   
Despite the recent public exposure to the “dangers” of immunizations by 
celebrities such as Jenny McCarthy, experts in the field of health have very little 
disagreement about the benefits of immunizations.  Demand for vaccinations is very 
weak in comparison to other public health initiatives, because media coverage has 
increased the concern over the side effects of immunization and led to decreases in 
vaccination coverage rates, especially in the United States and Sweden (Gauri and 




The quality and quantity of vaccine coverage to the public relies on the monetary 
and political resources of different interest groups and political actors.  The institutional 
setting in which policymakers work affects the success of the coverage rates.  In this 
political economy framework, institutions and other “rules of the game” determine the 
objectives of policymakers and thus determine the flow of resources.  However, this 
framework fails to explain the role of institutions in disseminating knowledge and 
motivating political actors and policy entrepreneurs.  The dissemination of knowledge 
and the motivation of policymakers are vastly important as vaccination coverage is an 
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area where consumer demand is low and healthcare provide incentives are poor (Gauri 
and Khaleghian, 2002).    
Government policymakers need to understand: establishment and dissemination 
of disease-burden data, vaccine effectiveness, assurance of adequate vaccine supply, and 
the creation of funding to supply the vaccines to low-income and underdeveloped areas 
(Gauri and Khaleghian, 2002).  
The United States government has made numerous policy decisions to increase 
immunization coverage.  In 1955, soon after the polio vaccine was approved, Congress 
passed a law to expedite state purchases of the vaccine.  The Kennedy Administration 
launched the Immunization Assistance Act of 1962, which provided federal support to 
state and local immunization programs that vaccinated for polio, diphtheria, pertussis, 
and tetanus (Hinman, 2005).  The United States government began to purchase large 
amounts of vaccines in the 1960s to lower the cost of vaccines to state and local agencies.  
In 1972, the Public Health Service Act provided grants to state and local governments for 
immunization development, and by the late 1980s childhood immunization rates had 
reached 83% (Johnson et al, 2000).   
The initiative to set national vaccine policy involves multiple agencies, including 
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Food and Drug Administration, 
National Immunization Program, and the Advisory Committee for Immunization 
Practices (Hinman, 2005). The passage of the Vaccines for Children (VFC) program in 
1993 guarantees federally purchased vaccines to more than 10 million children 
nationwide (Hinman, 2005).   
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The Costs and Benefits of Childhood Immunization through the Four Approaches 
 
Traditional Ex-ante CBA: 
Traditional ex-ante cost-benefit analysis occurs before a decision is made about 
whether or not to invest in a proposed policy.  It involves a number of steps, each of 
which has its challenges.  The first step involves identifying the set of alternative policies 
that could be implemented instead of the proposed policy.   It is very difficult to identify 
all of the alternative immunization policies that could be put into place.  The subsequent 
steps, listing the physical impacts of the alternative projects, predicting the impact of the 
project throughout its lifespan, attaching dollar values to the impacts predicted, and so 
forth are problematic in the real world as costs and benefits are often timely and 
expensive to determine.   Finally, the potential Pareto societal welfare criterion is nearly 
unreachable in government policy as many policies end up becoming redistributive in one 
form or another.  
The federal government has played a central role in the effort to increase 
vaccination of children and decrease vaccine preventable childhood diseases. Spurred by 
the polio epidemic, government officials conducting traditional ex-ante CBA argued that 
short-term costs would turn into long-term savings. The studies emphasized the positive 
effects of vaccine coverage and began to subsidize the dissemination of vaccinations for 
diseases like polio (Johnson et al, 2000).   
Numerous traditional ex-ante CBAs have been completed in the last sixty years 
due to the deep public investment in the national immunization system. These analyses 
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have shown that public good properties characterize vaccines.  Vaccines are going to be 
under-produced and incentives for development of vaccines will be needed for research 
and development to occur.  Agencies such as the Center for Disease Control have 
numerous policy researchers working to demonstrate positive cost-benefit ratios in order 
to continue to assure funding. 
 
Traditional Ex-Post CBA: 
Traditional ex-post CBA occurs after the impacts of the implemented project have 
been realized. The steps of ex-post CBA are the same steps as traditional ex-ante CBA, 
with the same issues, except that this analysis also involves computing the net present 
value of each alternative.  If the net present value is greater than zero, the project exhibits 
positive returns. The main challenge of performing ex-post traditional CBA with 
immunization policy is valuation of health and safety. Health and safety are treated as 
commodities. These approaches list all alternatives in terms of money, which treats all 
goods as replaceable by other goods (Graham, 1981). Addressing this challenge is a 
critical component of this research study. 
One of the big challenges of ex-post, as well as ex-ante, traditional CBA is 
bureaucratic and political influence.  Politicians, bureaucrats, and policy entrepreneurs 
often overestimate the benefits of their favored policy and underestimate the benefits of 
policies they do not favor. Thus, those in favor of continuation of current immunization 
policy would overestimate the positives of immunization policy that promotes those 
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ideals and underestimate those of the immunization policies that reinforce opposing 
ideals. 
Almost every society holds that the provision, requirement, and enforcement of 
vaccinations are tasks for the government.  Societies hold this notion because vaccines 
are under-provided and subject to the free-rider effect.  Vaccination provides a positive 
externality.  This means that benefits are accrued to all members of society when more 
members of that society get vaccinated against disease. The costs of the major six 
childhood vaccinations are relatively low, less than a $1 per fully immunized child.  
Thus, nearly all ex-post traditional CBAs have demonstrated the value of government 
subsidization and provision of vaccines.  Ex-post traditional CBAs show that vaccination 
availability has a positive effect.  
 
Empirical ex-ante CBA 
 
My approach of empirical ex-ante CBA was to determine the probability of a 
preschool-age child being fully vaccinated based on various demographic and 
socioeconomic variables. If it can be shown the probability is high, then this can be taken 
as evidence that the immunization policy is effective. The National Immunization Survey 
(NIS) is conducted by a subdivision of the Center for Disease Control (CDC) as part of 
the Childhood Immunization Initiative (CII).  In 1992 this initiative was established to 
reduce the cost of vaccines, increase vaccine usage, improve delivery of vaccines to 
children, and enhance awareness of vaccination and its benefits. The data used was only 
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for the year 2007, as the composition of the geographical areas that the CDC surveyed 
changes from year to year.    
The NIS uses a random digit dialing (RDD) telephone survey to identify 
households containing children in the target age-range and interviews the adult who is 
most knowledgeable about the child’s vaccinations. With consent of the child’s parent or 
guardian, the NIS also contacts (by mail) the child’s healthcare provider(s) to request 
information on vaccinations from the child’s medical records. Samples of telephone 
numbers are drawn independently for each calendar quarter within selected geographical 
areas, or strata.  
In 2007, there were 64 geographic strata for which vaccine coverage levels can be 
estimated, including 14 primarily urban city/county areas (including the District of 
Columbia).  The remaining 50 are either an entire state or a “rest of state” area. This 
design makes it possible to produce annual estimates of vaccination coverage levels 
within each of the 64 estimation areas with a specified degree of precision (a coefficient 
of variation of approximately 7.5 percent). Further, by using the same data collection 
methodology and survey instruments in all estimation areas, the NIS produces 
comparable vaccination coverage levels among estimation areas and over time.  
For the 2007 NIS, the household interviews began on January 4, 2007 and ended 
on February 14, 2008. Provider data collection extended from February 2007 to April 
2008. A total sample of approximately 4.5 million telephone numbers yielded household 
interviews for 24,807 children, 17,017 of whom had provider data adequate to determine 
whether the child was up-to-date with respect to the recommended immunization 
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schedule. The 2007 NIS public-use data file contains data for the 24,807 children with 
completed household interviews, and more extensive data for the 17,017 children with 
adequate provider data (including 128 zero-shot children). 
 The design and implementation of the NIS sample involve four procedures. First, 
statistical models predict the number of sample telephone numbers needed in each 
estimation area to meet the target precision requirements. Second, the sample for an 
estimation area is divided into random sub-samples called replicates. By releasing 
replicates as needed, it is possible to spread the interviews for each sampling area evenly 
across the entire calendar quarter. Third, an automated procedure eliminates a portion of 
the non-working and non-residential telephone numbers from the sample before the 
interviewers dial them. Fourth, the sample telephone numbers are matched against a 
national database of residential telephone numbers in order to obtain usable mailing 
addresses for as many sample households as possible. To promote participation in the 
NIS, an advance letter is sent to these addresses approximately two weeks prior to the 
household interview. My data can be found and my study replicated through the NIS site.   
The probability of immunization depends on a number of factors.  The 
methodology taken here is to develop a model that relates the probability of a preschool 
age child being fully vaccinated (as verified by their vaccination provider) to several 
demographic factors.  Logistic regression is used to analyze the model and determine 
which factors have a significant relationship to the probability of immunization. Higher 
birth order of a child is a factor highly correlated with full immunization status.  The 
more children in the family, the less likely the later born children will receive their 
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childhood immunizations (Steele, 1996).  Also, the benefits of immunizing another child 
are reduced as more children are immunized.  Children born into large families have a 
low vaccination uptake (Levine, 2011).  Thus, I included a variable in the logistic 
regression model for first born child versus others, FRSTBRN.  
I include healthcare coverage in my model, as many children in the United States 
lack medical insurance (Zhou, 2005).  The ‘free’ clinic option often involves opportunity 
costs that low-income families are not worth taking, such as parental time off from work, 
long waiting lines, and long travel time to a ‘free’ clinic.  There are various types of 
health insurance offered in the United States ranging from employer, Medicaid, SCHIP, 
Indian health insurance, or military.  Thus, various types of health insurance were 
grouped into one variable called OVERINS which is equal to one if the child had some 
form of insurance, zero otherwise. 
Poverty status is also included in the model, as income and wealth are influential 
due to that fact that the health service fee may pose too large of a burden on lower 
income families (Levine, 2011). Those who are unwilling or unable to pay for vaccines 
via their own means or healthcare coverage will not receive them. In a study of a 12-
county area of China, greater access to immunizations by means of lower fees and more 
immunization days were found to be significantly related to a higher rate of immunizing.  
A study done in India determined that many children were only partially 
immunized because the parents were so engaged in livelihood activities (Zhou, 2005).  A 
recent Medicare study found that “more education, higher income, more knowledge 
about and positive attitudes toward immunization, and health insurance” are all correlated 
 
 62 
with higher rates of immunization (Levine, 2011).  Income level is designated by variable 
INCPOV1, which has three categorical values. A variable equal to one, corresponds to 
those above poverty and having annual greater income than $75,000; equal to two, those 
above poverty but below $75,000; and equal to three, those who are below poverty level.   
I broke the data into four census regions with variable CEN_REG.  The Northeast 
region of the United States is region1; region 2 is the Midwest region; region 3 is the 
South; and region 4 is the western portion of the United States.  Immunization scholars 
have found immunization uptake varies by region (Levine, 2011). 
In China, the gender of the child is highly important.   Boys are more likely to be 
vaccinated than girls, probably because of the cultural idea of men continuing the family 
line.  Men also are needed in rural areas for farming in China, so this gender effect will 
most likely be larger in rural areas (Zhou, 2005).  A similar study conducted in Malawi 
demonstrated that girls are less privileged in terms of accessing social services, which 
include health and education (Steele, 1996).   
Age of the mother is also important.  Teenage mothers are less likely to get their 
children vaccinated, probably due to lack of education.  There are three groups of 
mother’s ages called M_AGEGRP.  “One” is assigned if the mother’s age at time of 
survey is less than 19 years old, “two” if the mother is between the ages of twenty and 
twenty-nine years, and “three” if  mother’s age is greater than or equal to 30 years. 
The higher education of the mother correlates to a higher probability that her 
children will be vaccinated.  In Malawi in 2000, 88 percent of mothers who had a 
secondary school education had their children fully vaccinated compared to roughly 60 
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percent of mothers with no education (Steele, 1996). Uneducated mothers may not have 
their children immunized simply because they do not understand the importance of the 
shots (Levine, 2011).  Mother’s education is defined as Educ1 and is set equal to one for 
less than 12 years of schooling, two for 12 years of schooling, three for greater than 12 
years of schooling but no college degree, and four if the mother is a college graduate. 
Race is also strongly correlated with immunization rates.  Race is broken into four 
categories, designated by variable RACEETHK.  This variable is equal to one if the child 
is Hispanic, two if non-Hispanic black only, three if non-Hispanic white only, four if 
non-Hispanic, other, or multiple race.  On average, blacks in the Medicaid immunization 
study in 2006 have less formal education, lower incomes, and poorer health status.  Even 
when controlling for education, income, and insurance coverage, the immunization rates 
of blacks are never as high as whites (Zhou, 2005). In the table  “Logistic regression 
results,” model terms with a p-value less than 0.05 are considered signficant.   
 
 
Logistic Regression Results 
  
     Parameter  Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr >ChiSq 
Intercept 0.4753 0.0722 48.2975 <0.0001 
EDUC1 1 -0.1222 0.0483 6.4169 0.0113 
EDUC1 2 -0.064 0.0364 3.0844 0.079 
EDUC1 3 -0.0135 0.032 0.1784 0.6728 
FRSTBRN 1 -0.0997 0.0182 30.0886 <0.0001 
RACEETHK 1 0.1019 0.0391 6.7973 0.0091 
RACEETHK 2 0.0757 0.0308 6.0291 0.0141 
RACEETHK 3 -0.1291 0.0517 6.23335 0.0125 
M_AGEGRP 1 -0.0852 0.0898 0.902 0.3422 
M_AGEGRP 2 -0.0291 0.049 0.3516 0.5532 
INCPOV1 1 0.1128 0.041 7.5706 0.0059 
INCPOV1 2 -0.0425 0.0342 1.5432 0.2141 
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INCPOV1 3 -0.0944 0.046 4.2139 0.0401 
CEN_REG 1 0.1572 0.0391 16.1894 <0.0001 
CEN_REG 2 -0.0323 0.0337 0.9225 0.5368 
CEN_REG 3 0.0572 0.0282 4.0987 0.0429 




Odds Ratio Estimates 
     
   
Point 
Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
EDUC1 1 vs.   4 0.725 0.627 0.837 
 EDUC1 2  vs.   4 0.768 0.686 0.86 
 EDUC1 3 vs.   4 0.808 0.738 0.885 
 FRSTBRN 1 vs.   2 0.819 0.763 0.88 
 RACEETHK 1 vs.   4 1.162 1.009 1.338 
 RACEETHK 2 vs.   4 1.132 1.003 1.278 
 RACEETHK 3 vs.   4 0.922 0.778 1.094 
 M_AGEGRP 1 vs.   3 0.819 0.626 1.071 
 M_AGEGRP 2 vs.   3 0.866 0.798 0.941 
 INCPOV1 1 vs.   4 1.093 0.898 1.33 
 INCPOV2 2 vs.   4 0.936 0.775 1.13 
 INCPOV1 3 vs.   4 0.888 0.728 1.084 
 CEN_REG 1 vs.   4 1.404 1.249 1.578 
 CEN_REG 2 vs.   4 1.162 1.048 1.287 
 CEN_REG 3 vs.   4 1.27 1.163 1.387 
 OVERINS 
  
1.077 0.999 1.161 
  
As seen in the “Logistic Regression Results” table, there are several variables that 
are significant or close to significant. The variables that are significant are EDUC1 1, 
FRSTBRN 1, RACEETHK 1,2,3, INCPOV 1,3, and CEN_REG 1,3. I did not include all 
variables that may have affected immunization status due to multicolinearity issues.   
In order to understand the “Odds Ratio” table, the reader must first understand the 
interpretation of an odds ratio. The odds ratio is equal to the 
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.  One of the significant variables in my analysis is 
child birth order.  The odds ratio of a preschool-age child being fully vaccinated 
decreases by a factor of 0.82 when we move from a first-born child to a later-born child. 
If the odds ratio is less than 1, the odds of a child being vaccinated decrease as we move 
from first-born to a later-born child. If the odds ratio is greater than 1, the odds of a child 
being vaccinated increase as we move from first-born to a later-born child.  For another 
example, the odds of a preschool-age child increase by a factor of 1.16 when we move 
from Hispanic child to a non-Hispanic white child.  Note that this is based on a simple 
logistic regression. Additional analysis of the model to correct for multi-collinearity 
and/or interaction among the dependent variables would be interesting. 
 
Ex-post empirical CBA 
 
Ex-post empirical CBA is used to determine if the relationship between the 
immunization policy and the outcome of interest (disease reduction) is significant.  
Researchers conducting ex-ante and ex-post traditional CBA, as well as ex-ante empirical 
CBA, have frequently demonstrated that when immunization coverage increased, disease 
costs also decreased (Kaddar et al, 2005).  However, there have been almost no research 
studies conducted with ex-post empirical CBA to determine the relationship between 
immunization policies and diseases reduction.   The most important additional challenge 
to the empirical ex-post CBA approach is difficulty in finding data that actually reflect 
policy implementation change and outcome variable change on the same unit of analysis 
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(for example, individual, state, year, etc.).  Unfortunately, this approach has not yet been 
used to examine the effects of immunization policy in the United States.  
 
Results and Conclusion 
 
The CBA approach that resulted in new insights into policy effects and 
implementation issues is ex-ante empirical.  This CBA is a logistic analysis of a simple 
model.  My model and analysis demonstrates that the empirical ex-ante CBA can provide 
more insight into immunization policy than the traditional approaches to CBA.  I was not 
trying to do an overall CBA of immunization policy, that would take more data, more 
years, and a much more complicated model.   
Using logistic regression, the factors that are most significant in the model are 
FRSTBRN and CEN_REG1.  For a one unit increase in FRSTBRN, the odds of a 
preschool-age child being fully vaccinated (vs. not being fully vaccinated) increase by a 
factor of 0.819.  This may be due to the fact that parents are more cautious with first born 
children and may become more carefree with the births of subsequent children.  The 
more children in the family, the less likely the later-born children will receive their 
childhood immunizations (Steele 1996).  Also, the benefits of immunizing another child 
are reduced as more children are immunized.   
CEN_REG1 indicates that the preschool-age child resides in the Northeast region 
of the United States.  The odds of a child born in the Northeast being immunize versus a 
child born in the West are between 1.249 and 1.578.  The Northeast has a higher cost of 
 
 67 
living than the rest of the country. Due to smaller space for housing, the parents might 
want space away from their children.  Thus, parents may choose higher quality children 
over quantity.  With more land out West and more room for children to roam, parents 
may choose a higher number of children and spend less on each child in terms of 
healthcare.  A child born in the South is between 1.163 and 1.387 times as likely to be 
immunized as a child born in the West.   
The only level of education that is significant in influencing whether or not a child 
had been immunized was EDUC1, which indicates that the mother has less than twelve 
years of education.  The difference between the mother having a high school education 
versus college and beyond is not significant.  This is surprising since income levels for 
high school versus college graduates seem to be very different and income level was 
found to be significant with immunization rates.   
The main finding from my study is that immunization probability actually varies 
widely among demographic groups.  Some demographic groups have extremely low 
probabilities of immunization. Targeting those groups could have a big benefit in 











CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
My dissertation has explored the usefulness of cost-benefit analysis in evaluating 
policies addressed in two social issues: the Expanded Food and Nutrition Education 
Program and child immunization.  Examination of these social issues has provided 
scholarly insight into the potential uses and misuses of the four types of cost-benefit 
analysis outlined earlier. The application of the various types of cost-benefit analysis to 
each policy issue produced unique conclusions, and each issue merits further exploration 
for meaningful policy recommendations. 
 
Lessons from EFNEP Policy Analysis 
 
Numerous policy options in the community intervention literature suggest how to 
bridge the gap between nutrition education programs such as EFNEP and outcomes.  In 
times of limited funding, it is essential that continuing long-term programs such as 
EFNEP demonstrate economic efficiency through accountability measures. Currently, all 
states must administer a national pre- and post-program test survey to program 
participants. The test involves ten summative questions all of which fail to inquire about 
participants’ skill, knowledge, behavior, and attitude about nutrition before and after 
completing the program.  This is a major oversight. The evaluation methods need to 
reflect the various facets that demonstrate participant life-style change.   
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It is easy to argue for the policy effectiveness of EFNEP when conducting 
traditional ex-ante and traditional ex-post approaches, as these are relatively 
straightforward to conduct.  As my research demonstrates, the empirical ex-ante and ex-
post approach are much more difficult approaches to demonstrating the importance of 
EFNEP as there are no good data sets available for the relevant independent and 
dependent variables.   
No system has been developed or utilized by EFNEP administrators to nationally 
evaluate or systematically address the survey results so as to provide meaningful 
feedback to program practitioners.  Government mandated, results-based accountability 
methodology would provide EFNEP practitioners and administrators tools and 
information to achieve outcomes. Furthermore, government funded, research-driven 
community trials that follow participants for at least five years following program 
participation would demonstrate whether EFNEP programming is having long-term 
desirable effects.   
Research on the effectiveness of programs such as EFNEP is one way to ensure 
that social assistance programs are serving the needs of those who lack food security, 
suffer nutrient-poor diets, and are at high risk for chronic disease.  The consequences of 
food insecurity such as malnutrition and poor mental health reduce individual’s ability to 
be a productive member of society. 
Researchers recommend the following policy evaluation tools: 1) increased 
accountability measures, 2) longitudinal research studies, 3) state-state comparison 
studies and conferences. All are crucial measures to increasing overall well-being in the 
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United States. The overall conclusion from my EFNEP policy analysis is that it is very 
difficult to show that EFNEP leads to long-term disease reduction. 
 
Lessons learned from Immunization Policy Analysis 
 
 As discussed in the immunization chapter, the benefits to vaccination coverage 
are widespread and numerous.  However, since only older generations can remember the 
infectious diseases for which we now have vaccinations, younger generations often 
distrust the need and value of vaccinations.  It is becoming increasingly difficult to 
maintain the level of immunization coverage needed for herd immunity (Vernon, 2003).  
My research did not consider the traditional ex-ante and ex-post cost-benefit analysis 
approaches because numerous scholars have already thoroughly exhausted these 
approaches.  Instead, my study follows the empirical ex-ante and ex-post methodology.  
Using this methodology, this research was able to determine socio-demographic groups 
that are least likely to get vaccinated, so that policymakers can target those groups. 
 Moving beyond all four types of cost-benefit analysis, most immunization 
scholars believe that qualitative research would be the best way to fix low vaccination 
rates.  Roberts et al state, “The main barrier to successful combination of qualitative and 
quantitative research in increasing vaccination coverage is that methods for incorporation 
of qualitative research are underutilized” (1596, 2002).   Qualitative research methods 
such as focus groups and ethnography draw attention to lay beliefs and identify parental 
concerns about exposing children to potential risk, as well as moral and religious 
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objections (Roberts et al, 2002).  The few qualitative research studies that have been 
conducted so far ran focus groups with immunizers and non-immunizers.  Non-
immunizers were more likely to be concerned with long-term side effects of vaccines 
(Vernon, 2003).   
 Policy researchers have determined that once health service factor improvements 
are made (such as those mentioned in the Immunization chapter), the next best method 
for vaccination improvement is financial incentives for mothers (Levine et al, 2011).  
Furthermore, there needs to be concordance at a local and state level. Local and state 
communities need to have public discussions to better disseminate vaccination coverage 




There are many findings in my research that will affect how policy analysts and 
scholars conduct future research is conducted by policy analysts and scholars.  The first 
finding is that cost-benefit analysis can be separated into four approaches: ex-ante 
traditional, ex-post traditional, ex-ante empirical, and ex-post empirical. Separating the 
challenges into components associated with each approach can help identify specific and 
tractable solutions to the challenges.  Policy analysts should consider each type before 
jumping into performing traditional ex-ante and ex-post or regression analysis.   
The second result is that the four types of cost-benefit analysis are not equally 
suitable to apply to every policy or problem with policy implications. In the chapter 
 
 72 
regarding EFNEP, traditional ex-ante and empirical ex-post were not possible to conduct. 
The policy had already occurred, so there was no need for traditional ex-ante analysis.  
Empirical ex-post analysis was impossible due to severe data restrictions.  In my research 
regarding the problem of immunization, traditional ex-post and empirical ex-post CBA 
were not possible as no new policy had been enacted. 
The third finding of my research is that researchers and policy scholars need to 
consider the advantages and disadvantages of each type of cost-benefit analysis before 
starting new research.  Never before has there been a clear delineation of the four ways to 
approach cost-benefit analysis.  Researchers should consider the many neo-classical 
economic assumptions that come into play when conducting the two types of traditional 
cost-benefit analysis.  While the two types of empirical cost-benefit analysis do not have 
as many assumptions, the lack of ability to gather primary data and to manipulate 
secondary data often renders empirical analysis useless.  Both regression approaches to 
EFNEP and immunization policy analysis demonstrated that it is very difficult to conduct 
empirical CBA of either type.   
The fourth determination was that the “easiest” CBA’s to conduct are ex-ante 
traditional and ex-ante empirical.  It is easier to hypothesize what will happen than to 
determine what has happened. 
Given this conclusion, the fifth finding of this research is that the most useful type 
of CBA is ex-post empirical, because EFNEP and immunization policy analysis found 
new information that had not been demonstrated previously. However, realistically it is 
often difficult to acquire data on the population the policy is supposed to affect.  The 
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most important challenge to the empirical ex-post cost-benefit analysis approach is 
difficulty in finding data that actually reflect policy implementation change and outcome 
variable change on the same unit of analysis (individual, state, year, etc.).  It is extremely 
difficult to find a data set in which researchers are able to clearly designate a population 
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